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THE POLITICS OF COMMON LAW IN
THEORY AND HISTORY
By IAN DUNCANSON*
This paper is concerned with the theme of law as an outsider, in theory
and practice, and with its appearance as the cohesive force which
intervenes to make social order possible. In the first part of the paper
I look at two legal theories and at two examples of what I take to be
liberal historiography. In the second part I discuss the English common
law, and the implications of its close association with agrarian capitalism
and City of London finance.
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I. LEGAL THEORY
Neither of the two contemporary grand theories about law
which are considered here seems to conceive of it as outsider to the
society in which it is found. Hart's espousal of ordinary language
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philosophy, for example, finds him insisting upon knowing how we
use the term law as a condition of his - and our - understanding
it. That much is well known.1 Equally well-known is that further
into his Concept of Law, we seem to drop out of the picture. The
ultimate criterion of legality is to be found in official conceptions of
obligatedness in a "complex but normally concordant practice of the
courts, officials and private persons."2  Later, the private persons
drop out too. Their only necessary role is that of adherence to the
requirements of the system, although Hart says that in a desirable
system they will adhere because they wish to, rather than because
they are afraid of the consequence of doing anything else.3  The
organization of legality is better the more private individuals
assimilate their attitudes and actions to those of the officials. In
moral terms it is better still if legal rules are prospective, private
sexual behaviour among adults is subject to minimal interference,4
people are treated as responsible agentsS and, perhaps, a right to life
is recognized.6
Hart's social-democratic political beliefs presumably commit
him to a social security program of minimum income provision,
affordable health care, education, and so on, similar to the model
espoused by D.N. MacCormick.7  However, for Hart - as for
MacCormick - the precondition for these valuable measures is the
1 H.L.A. Hart, 'Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence" (1953) 70 Law Q. Rev. 37. See
also B. Edgeworth, "The Philosophy of Language, Legal Positivism and Sociological Theory:
A Critique of H.L.A. Harts 'Descriptive Sociology'" (1986) 6 Legal Studies 115; and I.
Duncanson, "Hermeneutics and Persistent Questions in Hart's Jurisprudence" (1987) Jur. Rev.
113. On J.L Austin, see K. Graham, JL Austin: A Critique of Ordinary Language Philosophy
(Hassocks, Sussex, England: Harvester Press, 1977).
2 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) at 107 [hereinafter
Concept]; I. Duncanson, "The Strange World of English Jurisprudence" [1979] N.I.LQ. 207.
3 Ibid. at 113-14.
4 H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963).
5 H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968).
6 H.L.A. Hart, "Are There Any Natural Rights?" (1955) 64 Philosophical Review 175.
7 D.N. MacCormick, H.LA. Hart (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981) c. 1.
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formal structure of laws, whose ultimate authority lies in the fact
that it derives from the process of official recognition.8
Twenty-five years after Hart's major work, Ronald Dworkin
published his principal book, Law's Empire.9 At the beginning he
writes of "our" legal system, and "people who have law." It is, he
says, an argumentative practice, and only a participant's perspective
can make sense of it, by examining how insiders argue about law,
and how they ground their claims and seek to sustain their views.
Who are the participants? The list is a broad one, including
at first everyone who argues about law: bankers, district attorneys,
trade unionists, law teachers and citizens. Only minors and the mad
seem not to be considered. But Dworkin takes judicial argument as
his paradigm case of argument about law. Moreover, he says that
in every case in which there is disagreement about what the law is,
there will be a correct answer. The procedure he prescribes for
reaching that answer seems to call for specialist skills beyond those
of the citizen.
First, he says, we must make something like Kant's
assumption,10 namely, that humans have certain rights merely by
virtue of their being human: rights to rough equality, equal
treatment and justice. A legal system which recognized these would
include safeguards for securing due process and equality before the
law.
Second, we look for what law students come to term the
sources of law: statutes, judicial decisions, delegated legislation, and
perhaps we should add, the pattern of expectations built up in
particular trades or industries. Legal practitioners will have little
difficulty in recognizing these phenomena, pre-interpretive law, in
Dworkin's phrase. There can, he says, be no argument about -the
8 D.N. MacCormick, Legal Right and Social Democracy: Essays in Legal and Political
Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) c. 3.
9 R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1986) [hereinafter Law's].
The comments in the next two paragraphs are from Chapter 1.
10 The specific reference to Kant is in R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London:
Duckworth, 1977) at 198-99 [hereinafter Taking].
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grounds of law, and therefore about the best possible interpretation
of the rules, until the rules at this level have been identified."
There are two problems here which are worth noting before
proceeding with Dworkin's schema. The first is that the list of
people who argue about the law - citizens, trade unionists, bankers
and others - seem at this point to have to defer to legal
professionals. This returns us to a position in Dworkin's earlier
writing in which professional competence is a prerequisite for
understanding the nature of law.12  "Our" involvement in the legal
system is thus crucially restricted. But nowhere is legal practice as
such defined, except in relation to the pre-interpreted rules
identified by legal practice. The circularity is reminiscent of that
which surrounds Hart's ultimate rule, the rule of recognition, which
is constituted by the officials whose official status it constitutes.
What is foreclosed by permitting legal practitioners to
identify the basic legal data is the possibility of identifying both the
practice and the data as embedded in a broader set of social
relations and cultural assumptions.13 A theoretical perspective upon
the process of embedding could explain all subsequent interpretation
in terms of "our" political morality, or institutions, or legality as a
form of ideological closure, or elision of alternative points of view.
It could begin, moreover, to explain how "our" community is
producing more poverty, greater inequality and less accountability,1 4
despite Dworkin's sanguine assumptions that we all belong to it as
broadly equal and reciprocally concerned members and that
structural inequalities in the social orders to which he refers - the
U.K. and the U.S. - do not preclude the expression and realization
of a consensual notion of social justice.
This, however, is to anticipate. To return to Dworkin's
schema for interpretation, the third phase involves giving the pre-
11
Law's, supra, note 9 at 90-91.
12 Taking, supra, note 10 at 284.
13 See N.E. Simmonds, "Imperial Visions and Mundane Practices" (1987) 18
Cambridge L.J. 465.
14 J. Rentoul, The Rich Get Richer: The Growth of Inequality in Britain in the 1980s
(London: Unwin, 1987); Bob Jessop, K. Bonnett, S. Bromley and T. Ling, "Popular Capitalism,'
Flexible Accumulation and Left Strategy" (1987) 165 New Left Rev. 104.
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interpreted data the best possible interpretation. Bearing in mind
the background fights, we take into account the entire set of
political institutions, practices, morality and beliefs of the community
and treat them as a single whole. We distil from them a meaning
and apply it to the disagreement at hand in order to find the correct
answer.15
No human judge can hope to accomplish such a task, which
means that the meaning of the community is never fully realized.
Nevertheless, Dworkin provides an ideal in the shape of Judge
Hercules, a man of infinite intellectual capacity and speed, who can
perform all the calculations necessary. Human judges must ask
themselves, "what would Hercules have done in my place?"
No real set of political practices will unproblematically yield
a coherent whole, but it is the task of interpretation to try to render
it one for the present.16  The interpreter must envisage the
community as "an enterprise as a whole." The interpretation
procedure is drawn from the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg
Gadamer 1 7  Gadamer's interpreter, unlike the one in older
hermeneutics, does not approach the object to be interpreted as if
it belonged to the past, as if its meaning were to be located in the
conditions of its production and first reception. Instead, he seeks
"the historical meaning, for us, in the present.18 Understanding is
"a matter of placing oneself in a tradition, and then in an event
which transmits tradition to him."19 Perhaps, as a member of the
community one is part of a tradition. The event - the text for
Gadamer, preinterpreted law for Dworkin - is the means by which
one comes to be aware of the. tradition to which it belongs,
something which stretches up to the present and encompasses
15 See Law's, supra, note 9 at 225.
1 6 ]bd at 217.
17 H.G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. G. Barden & J. Cumming (New York:
Crossroad, 1982).
18 R. Palmer, Henneneutics: Interpretation Theories in Schleiermacher, Dlthey, Heidegger
and Gadamer (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1969) at 185.
19 Ibid.
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oneself. In turn, the tradition tells us the meaning of the event -
text or law.
Both Gadamer and Dworkin assume the discrete wholeness
and potential coherence of tradition, and ignore the possibility or
significance of opposition. However, consensus is often achieved at
the cost of silencing opposition, and tradition will be "as often as
not, a monologue of the powerful to the powerless."2
0
Political states which are communities are qua community,
"enterprises as a whole" governed by common principles, of which
Dworkin says, first, members regard their obligations to each other
as more important than obligations towards non-members. Second,
deriving from this, is a reciprocal concern for the well-being of
members. Third, within the community there exists a conceptual
egalitarianism, by which is meant not equality, but the idea that
nobody's life is to count for more than anyone else's.21
It is hard to see how these criteria would enable one to
identify the existence of a community unless one already knew to
look for a territory over which jurisdiction was claimed by a political
state. On the other hand, looking at the practices of political states
like the U.K, the U.S. and Australia, it would be hard to recognize
them as communities on such criteria.
In Australia, Aborigines have an average life expectancy
twenty years less than whites. Further, men in the lowest
occupational group are 1.54 times more likely to die of cancer than
men in the highest group, 2.86 times more likely to die of an
accident, and 4.88 times more likely to suffer from a mental
disorder.22 The morbidity and mortality figures replay themselves in
the areas of education, housing and general use of the welfare state.
Where is the concern about other members' well-being, or the idea
that all lives are of equal worth?
The British state, with its carefully cultivated national identity
based upon the Home Counties, "the countryside of the mind," as it
has been called, presides over Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland,
20 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1983) at 73.
21 Law's, supra, note 9 c. 5 and 6.
2 2 Melbourne .Age (10 November 1988).
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as well as the preventibly depressed areas of the deindustrialized
north. Outbreaks of jingoism apart, it is hard to see what makes
this population a community.23
The interpretation of the political state as community is one
that belongs in the sentimental rhetoric about families of nations
rather than in serious analysis. Community, if it is to retain
conceptual currency, should be reserved for small groups whose
membership does not need an interpreter to reveal to them their
reciprocal relations. Michael Taylor's criteria are especially plausible:
members of a community must have beliefs and values in common;
and the relations among them must be direct - "unmediated by
representatives, leaders, bureaucrats, institutions such as . . . the
state, abstractions and reifications" - and manysided. A community
properly so-called would be characterized by mutual aid, solidarity
and exchanges.24
A political state could conceivably be made up of such
communities, but for justification of the state we should look
elsewhere than at the unconvincing cachet conferred by the term
"community." Where does this leave Hercules? It leaves him on
the one hand performing the un-Herculean task of arbitrating easy
cases which, as Nigel Simmonds points out, is the important but
unspectacular task of most adjudicators most of the time.25 On the
other hand, it leaves him with controversial cases, but without the
pretense that he is applying community standards.
His qualifications for deciding routine cases are that he is
experienced and that he is not personally interested in the
outcome.26 As to the controversial cases, we have to accept that he
23 Law's, supra, note 9 at 206, Dworkin asserts that aggressive nationalism is not a
necessary accompaniment of his idea of "associative community." "We can now reply that the
best interpretation of our own legal practices disfavours that feature, which is anyway no
longer explicitly endorsed, even in bare practice." Where was he when Reagan campaigned
on a foreign policy platform of making America respected again?
24 M. Taylor, Community, Anarchy and Liberty (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1982) at 32-33.
25 Simmonds, supra, note 13.
26 In Cuba, this principle is considered consistent with the requirement that provincial
and municipal courts report periodically to the relevant popular assembly. See Domingo
Garcia Cardenas, State Organization in Cuba (Havana: Jose Marti Press, 1986) at 92-93.
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occupies a gendered position in any highly gender-structured
common law jurisdiction. He also occupies a class position, and a
position on another socially constructed dimension, namely that of
ethnicity. Any truth which he produces for us can emanate only
from his capacity to abstract himself from any of these sites into
divinity.
II. RATIONALITIES AND ORDERING
Hobbes recognized this situation.27 For him, there were two
choices. Such is human nature, in Hobbesian discourse, that people
cannot rise above their differences on a routine basis. This does not
mean that everyone is purely self-interested, egotistic and incapable
of altruism. He meant that moral questions and questions about
justice can be given objectively correct answers only when there is
a power in the state invested with the capacity to supply them.28 So
long as we are all entitled to assume the correctness of our
subjective opinions, we shall spend our time in squabbling about
them rather than in investing in cooperative schemes necessary for
arts, commerce, agriculture and industry to flourish. This "private"
activity, in what Hegel was to call "civil society," can supply us with
the possibility of "commodious living" only when political questions
are settled by an outside and superior rationality.
There is a particular urgency in the Hobbesian project.
Because people are possessed of reason and because some of them
are covertly malevolent, everyone exists in a state of mutual
apprehension and hostility: the war of all against all. The solution,
like the problem, is supplied by reason, whose exercise leads people
to abandon their "free" subjectivism and enter agreements to vest
their powers in a sovereign.29
Garcia Cardenas, State Organization in Cuba (Havana: Jose Marti Press, 1986) at 92-93.
27 Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Collins, 1972) c. 13, De Cive (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1949) c. 13.
28 Leviathan, ibid. c. 27; De Homine (New York. Humanities Press, 1978) c. 13.
2 9 De Cive, supra, note 27 c. 2; Leviathan, ibid. c. 14-15.
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Lawrence Stone's picture of sixteenth and early seventeenth
century man is not dissimilar from that of Hobbes.3 ° The population
of Leviathan and De Homine is hot-blooded and quick to take
offence, child-like in its desire to tell the best story, but coming to
market for profit, not for the pleasure of company. Stone gives
Hobbes a Bowlby-esque twist: his people are affectionless, prying
and spiteful, always telling tales to the ecclesiastical courts about the
pecadilloes of others.31
One of the reasons for this is maternal deprivation and cold
uncaring parents, who rear children to become violence-prone, easily
frustrated and incapable of forming deep emotional bonds or lasting
relationships. The reason for this state of affairs is the high rate of
mortality, especially among young children and women in childbirth.
If life was precarious, Stone therefore suggests that it was also
cheap. When rational order and community coherence evolved in
a more stable way, it was because better living conditions among the
rich enabled them to form more lasting and familiar bonds, and to
become more patient and forbearing.32
In Stone's book, the lower orders are led from chaos to
enlightenment by their betters. Doubtless at any period there is an
ample literature on the shortcomings of inferiors. Susan Reynolds
cites some from before 1100,33 John Hirst points to the Benthamites'
role in the vilification of the early Australian settlement,3 4 and
Gareth Stedman Jones writes in Outcast London35 of the dread
respectable Londoners felt for the fringedwellers of the unknown
East End.
30 L Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in Englan4 1500-1800 (Harmondsworth:
Penguin Books, 1979).
31 ]bid at 76.
32 Ibid c. 6.
33 S. Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europ4 900-1300 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1984) at 109.
34 J.B. Hirst, Convict Society and its Enemies: A History of Early New South Wales
(Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1983) c. 1.
35 G.S. Jones, Outcast London: A Study in the Relationship Between Classes in Victorian
Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).
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But Stone has been criticized for ignoring evidence about
grief after the death of children.36 Mourning the loss of a spouse
was one important reason why widows did not remarry if there were
no young children. Ironically, infant mortality seems to have been
highest among the rich, who put their children out to wetnurses,
thus foregoing the birth-control benefits of breast-feeding and
conceiving more or less annually.37
Court records may not be good enough indicators of a
Hobbesian state in any event, whatever the causes may have been.
The ecclesiastical courts were accused by Christopher Hill's
"industrious sort of people," the sixteenth century artisans who were
often dissenters, of being over-zealous in pursuing alleged offenders
in order to generate fines.38
Many examples of individuals litigating may turn out to have
been merely records of amicable settlement achieved elsewhere.
Manorial court records were used for this purpose, and there is
evidence that it was not uncommon in ecclesiastical courts. The
initial setting down may have been intended to speed settlement up,
or to prove one's seriousness.39 Discord in local communities was
a cause for concern. Resources were mobilized, perhaps drawing
upon the aid of the priest to restore amity - the harmony and the
love which gave its name to the "love-days" set aside for the
purpose.40
36 See the "Introduction" of R. Houlbrooke, The English Family, 1450-1700 (London:
Longman, 1984). Stone is also criticized for his outdated view that the nuclear family is a
relatively late comer. In England it seems to be of some antiquity: see A. Macfarlane, The
Origins of English Individualism: The Family, Property and Social Transition (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1978).
37 D. McLaren, "Marital Fertility and Lactation, 1570-1720" in M. Prior, ed., Women in
English Society, 1500-1800 (London: Methuen, 1985).
38 C. Hill, Society and Puritanism in Pre-Revolutionary England (New York: Schocken
Books, 1964) c. 8.
39 J.A. Sharpe, "'Such Disagreement Betwy Neighbours:' Litigation and Human Relations
in Early Modern England" in J. Bossy, ed., Disputes and Settlements: Law and Human Relations
in the West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) [hereinafter Disputes]; A.W.B.
Simpson, An Introduction to the History of Land Law (London: Oxford University Press, 1961)
at 137.
40 M. Clanchy, 'Law and Love in the Middle Ages" in Disputes, ibid
696 [VOL. 27 NO. 4
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It seems that Stone, and Keith Thomas 41 too at times, have
reacted rather harshly at the vision of more intrusive, close-knit and
collective life-styles than most middle-class people in advanced
countries are accustomed to. Life in a Cuban neighborhood, with
its elected block committee, has something of the same flavor.
42
But if early modern communities seem to have confined the
boundaries of private domesticity, they have not eliminated it.43
And if Laing and others are to be believed, enclosed domesticity,
too, has its drawbacks.44
Thomas connects the pattern of English witchcraft trials to
the breakdown of community. The new Protestant Church left
individuals feeling vulnerable to curses and spells because it did not
offer rituals and counterspells to combat them, as the Roman church
had done.45 Against this background, he suggests that a new
individualistic ethos, one might say Hobbesian, pervaded the rural
poor. Alms were refused, the refuser experienced feelings of guilt
and the beggar responded with curses. This tension was resolved
with the aid of the witchcraft laws.
Witchcraft accusations ceased only when the rural poor no
longer felt guilty, perhaps because the Tudor Poor Law was put in
place, and when the ruling order, whose consent was required to
translate accusations into trials, ceased to believe in the evidence of
witchcraft in which their inferiors still place credence. Newtonian
physics, with its mechanical conceptions of cause and effect replaced
mysticism.
Once again, one has the picture of a backward peasantry,
sunk in superstition and anomie, being led into the modern world by
rational administration and scientific revolution. However, Thomas
says that there is no evidence one way or the other about an
increase or decrease in accusations of witchcraft, because they were
41 K. Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic: Studies in Popular Beliefs in Siaeenth
and Seventeenth Century England (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973).
42 P. Marshall, Cuba Libre: Breaking the Chains (Boston: Faber and Faber, 1987) at 80.
43 Houlbrooke, supra, note 36 at 22-23.
44 R.D. Laing, The Politics of Experience (New York: Pantheon Books, 1967.)
45 Thomas, supra, note 41 c. 14-18.
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too informal to have left records. All we do have evidence about
is the rate of prosecution, whatever prompted it. And, as Christina
Lamer has observed46 in the context of her discussion of Scottish
witchcraft, the upper classes continued to believe in some fairly odd
doctrines - a trinitarian god, a devil, resurrection and life after
death. Why should they have baulked at witches?
The Tudor Poor Law in its 1601 form, with open vestry
meetings, lowly overseers and deputy overseers, and fairly generous
reliefs, refocused rather than replaced community norms of
reciprocity within the structure of social hierarchy.47 It has to be
seen in this light rather than as merely a problem-solving imposition
by central government.
III. COMMON LAW AND AGRARIAN CAPITAL
It is important to stress the nature of local communities, not
as autonomous, nor, of course, as bucolic arcadia, but as viable social
units in a wider social ecology, maintaining what Edward Thompson
has called a "moral economy,"48 capable of being defended in. skilful
and prudent ways. If we concede to the suggestions - and often
these are implicit rather than explicit - that brutish chaos and
stultifying parochialism characterized life beyond the pale of
privilege, the ascendancy of common law in the period after the civil
war may come to seem like a response to a national requirement for
order and rationality.
In fact, as Weber suggests, the organizational forms of and
even informal demands for, local justice, stood in the way of the
46 C. Lamer, Enemies of God;- The Witch-hunt in Scotland (London: Chatto and Windus,
1981) at 13.
47 K. Snell, Annals of the Labouring Poor: Social Change and Agrarian England, 1660-
1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) c. 3.
48 E.P. Thompson, 'The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth
Century" (1971) Past and Present 76. For a similar report on the previous century, see J.
Walters, "Grain Riots and Popular Attitudes to the Law- Malden and the Crisis of 1629" in
J. Brewer & J. Styles eds, An Ungovernable People: The English and their Law in the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1980).
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requirements of agrarian capital accumulation.4 9 At its service, as he
also points out, more important than the common law, were the
common lawyers,50  the "organic intellectuals" of capitalism as
Maureen Cain calls them. They and their staffs, and the courts of
record, must be accounted part of the state when one contrasts the
small size of English central government bureaucracies with those of
the European monarchies.
In the period that we might, after Wallerstein, call the "long
seventeenth century"51 - from the last decades of Elizabeth, perhaps,
through the first decade of George 1, 1580s to the 1720s - the class
which by the Victorian era was known as the "landocracy" took
control of the apparatus of royal government. There was no long
term program, no revolutionary agenda, and no self-conscious
vanguard party leading the way, only a series of incremental steps
designed to safeguard property.
As the common law was the law of real property, it was the
common lawyers upon whom the landlords depended, and whose
vocabulary they were to bequeath to whig politics in England and
elsewhere.52 The landlords wanted a secure basis upon which to
augment their estates, improve them in order to enhance their rent
revenues, and project their designs into the future. The estates
were a source of wealth to the principal beneficiaries, but they also
had to support dependents, be sources of credit, and be flexible
enough to survive contingencies associated with politics and
personalities.53
49 M. Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociolog, 1st ed. by G.
Roth & C. Wittich, trans. E. Fischoff e. al. (Berkeley- University of California Press, 1978)
at 814.
50 "In England... the development of the law was practically in the hands of the lawyers
who, in the service of their capitalist clients, invented suitable forms for the transaction of
business...." bid. at 1395.
51 1. Wallerstein, Processes of the World-System, vol. II (New York- Academic Press,1980).
His long century of European economic consolidation was 1600-1750.
52 H. Nenner, By Colour of Law: Legal Culture and Constitutional Politics in England,
1660-1689 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977).
-53 L Bonfield, Marriage Settlements, 1601-1740: The Adoption of the Strict Settlement
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
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It was clear from the failure of Coke to establish the
supremacy of the common law, that while it might be used to
facilitate the rational calculations of agrarian capital, it could not be
insulated from hostile influences.54 For the king retained the power
to appoint and dismiss judges, and to suspend and dispense with the
ordinary operation of legal rules. There was also the disputed fiscal
power, and the power to pardon. Each of these was a threat to the
security of estates.
The seizure of Parliament and the decapitation, literally and
metaphorically, of the executive, was insufficient because government
by legislature proved impossible. Seizure of the executive, with its
prerogative powers, was also required, and in the end
accomplished 5 By this time the landlords and their common lawyer
agents had available an extremely flexible set of devices for
protecting their estates and achieving their plans.
These devices stretched from Petty Sessions - although in
other respects Justices of Peace were still caught up in the politics
of their localities - through the Assizes and the apparatus of the
Prerogative. They included Chancery, the courts of Common Law
and Parliament. On the one hand the lower orders were caught up
in a web of patronage and deference 6 On the other hand,
conflicting and competing objectives among the ruling class itself
could be coordinated and articulated. With the agency of the
common lawyers, through Chancery and Parliament, family
settlements could be constructed and reconstructed, enclosures
engineered, compulsory acquisition schemes devised to accommodate
canal and railway investment, and capital raised for urban property
54S. White, Sir Edward Coke and the Grievances of the Commonwealth (Manchester.
Manchester University Press, 1979); C. Hill, Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965) c. 6.
55 J.H. Plumb, The Growth of Political Stability in England, 1675-1725 (London:
Macmillan, 1967). Once this had been accomplished, the Parliamentary term was extended
from three to seven years, the franchise was narrowed, and competition for seats squeezed out
by raising the cost of elections.
56 D. Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law" in Thompson, Hay & Linebough
eds, Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (New York:
Pantheon, 1975).
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speculation.57 The common law was certainly the law of the land,
but equally, it was certainly not the law of the people.
IV. COMMON LAW AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION THESIS
If this was "old corruption" as it was bequeathed to the
Americans, many commentators want to report that, in England at
least, it was transformed in the following century when the
bourgeoisie at length challenged aristocratic power. It appears that
successive extensions of the franchise presented the ruling class with
precisely what Cromwell and Ireton had resisted in their debates
about the franchise with the army agitators on Putney Heath in
1647.58 It gave the propertyless political power through the
sovereign Parliament.
In British constitutional theory this would mean that the
people controlled the law through a form of representative
democracy. An intelligent ruling class, it might be supposed, would
have long before retreated behind a written constitution so as to
protect the form of social order necessary to safeguard their
interests.5 9  Such a supposition does not also presuppose a
monolithic class rule - old corruption had after all served both to
maintain property and to manage intra-class tensions.
Indeed, the democratization thesis has evoked the suggestion
that democracy has gone too far, that fairness and justice may have
become hostage to the volatile whims of populism.60 There have
been calls for limitations upon Parliamentary sovereignty, complaints
B. English & J. Saville, Strict Settlement: A Guide for Historians (Hull: University of
Hull Press, 1983).
58 A.S.P. Woodhouse, ed., Puritanism and Liberty: Being the Army Debates 1647-49 From
the Clarke Manuscripts (London: J.M. Dent, 1986) at 70.
59 See T. Ison, 'The Sovereignty of the Judiciary" (1985) 10 Adelaide Law Review 1; H.
Glasbeek and M. Mandel, 'The Legislation of Politics in Advanced Capitalism: The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1984) 2 Socialist Studies 84.
60 1. Gilmour, Inside Right: A Study of Conservatism (London: Quartet Books, 1978) at
211; Lord Hailsham, The Dilemma of Democracy: Diagnosis and Prescription (London: Collins,
1978). See the comments in J.A.G. Griffith's Chorley Lecture, reprinted (1979) 42 Mod. L.
Rev. 1.
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about the volume and complexity of legislation and its apparent
immunity from judicial scrutiny,61 sporadic contemplations of military
intervention62 and, finally, in the 1970s, talk of a bill of rights.63
However, the alarm has not been proportional to the threat
to property and privilege. If legal justice - due process and equality
before the law - and political justice - each to count for one but no
more than one - have been achieved, social justice in the form of
greater material equality has been curiously elusive. The rhetoric in
its favor may have been blunted by the vocabulary of incentives, but
the puzzle remains that Ireton's forebodings of 1647, that the
propertyless would use political power to redistribute property, have
not been realized. Whether one examines health, education,
longevity, control of the means of production, or, simply the
differentials of income and wealth, it is the case that in material
terms some count for very many more than one.64 As a letter to
Lansbury's Labour Weekly put it, in 1922:
My Lords - I see you have forbidden the Poplar Borough Council to pay its
labourers 4 pounds a week. None of you (except poor Wrenbury, who drags out
a hungry existence on about 55 pounds a week - often when I see a man shivering
at a street corner, I say "That may be poor Wrenbury) takes less than 120 pounds
a week, not counting your savings from past emoluments. It needed high moral
courage to announce to the world your profound conviction that any one of you
was worth thirty ordinary men. Except, of course, poor Wrenbury who is only
worth fourteen ordinary men.65
The explanations of this puzzle have varied. It has been argued that
the working class, who would be most attracted by a radical
61 G.H. Hewart, The New Despotism (London: E. Benn, 1929); C.K. Allen, Law and
Orders: An Inquiry Into the Nature and Scope of Delegated Legislation and Executive Powers
in England (London: Stevens, 1945). The concern here is that Parliamentary sovereignty has
produced executive government, and that only the rule of law can cope with the situation.
62 R.F.V. Heuston, Essays in Constitutional Law, 2d ed. (London: Stevens, 1964) at 1-
4; I. Gilmour, supra, note 60 at 211; P. Wright, Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a
Senior Intelligence Officer (New York: Viking, 1987) at 362.
63 1. Duncanson, "Balloonists, Bill of Rights and Dinosaurs" [1971] Public Law 391.
64 Of course, inequality is once more widening. J. Rentoul, supra, note 14; M. Loney,
The Politics of Greed The New Right and the Welfare State (London: Pluto, 1986); J. Gibson,
"he Working Class Under Thatcher" (1987) Confrontations 31.
65 Cited in N. Branson, Poplarism 1919-25: George Lansbury and the Councillors' Revolt
(London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1979) at 218.
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redistribution, may have, as Keith Thomas thought of the rural poor
in the sixteenth century, assimilated an individualist ethos. Another
suggestion is that the working class has simply all but disappeared,
absorbed into a new petty bourgeoisie. This is, as Callinicos. says,
implausible unless one abandons the Marxist identification of class
with ownership and control - and the lack of it - of the means of
production. Capitalist restructuring continually alters the nature of
the work process, but one should hesitate before assuming that the
latest change towards cleaner work conditions and monthly wages
means the end of the working class. 66
More technical responses to the puzzle suppose that perhaps,
after all, the truths of neoclassical economics contain some
substance, and that there are immutable obstacles to egalitarianism
and participatory decision-making in the economic sphere. Finally,
there are those who see the answer in policy failures, and the
resolution in close scrutiny of policy formation and implementation.
None of these somewhat ad hoc speculations is necessary if
one accepts the arguments of Perry Anderson and others.67  They
hold that there has never been a transition of power to the
industrial bourgeois, and still less so to the working class. There is
support for their denial of the democratization thesis from the
burgeoning literature on the decline of Britain as an industrial
power. 6
The argument is that the composition of industrial capital in
Britain was always modest, and always dwarfed by that of the
66 A. Callinicos & C. Harman, The Changing Working Class: Essays on Class Structure
Today (London: Pluto Press, 1987); E.M. Woods, The Retreat From Class: A New "True"
Socialism (London: Verso, 1986).
6 7 p. Anderson, "the Origins of the Present Crisis" in P. Anderson & R. Blackburn eds,
Towards Socialism (London: Fontana Library, 1965); P. Anderson, "The Figures of Descent'
(1987) 161 New Left Review 20; T. Nairn, Breakup of Britain: Crisis and Neo-nationalism
(London: NLB, 1977).
68 M. Wiener, English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit 1850-1980
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); M.W. Kirby, The Decline of British Economic
Power Since 1870 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981); A. Gamble, Britain in Decline: Economic
Policy, Political Strategy and the British State, 2d ed. (London: Macmillan, 1985) at c. 3; K.
Smith, The British Economic Crisis: Its Past and Future (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986); K.
Williams, I. Williams & D. Thomas, Why Are the British Bad at Manufacturing? (London:
R.K.P., 1983). The following four paragraphs are drawn from the above.
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landocracy. The enormous fruits of agrarian capital accumulation
were never channeled into industry, but flowed from the great
estates, augmented by the revenues from mineral extraction and the
urban booms, into finance, shipping and insurance, internationally
oriented service industries based on the City of London.
There is a diversity of evidence for this position. City profits
and the returns from associated overseas investments have
consistently been higher than those from industry in the 1850s.
Free trade and laissez-faire policies of a sort were maintained long
after they ceased to make industrial sense. The British currency has
always been kept at the highest possible level, something favouring
capital exports and "invisibles" trading far more than industry. In the
past few decades, progressive deindustrialisation has made the
process more apparent. With a gross national product that has
declined in world-relative terms to equal that of Italy, British
overseas investments are second only to Japan's, and the City
remains financially of global significance.
In cultural terms there has always been a disdain for "trade"
in hegemonic discourse. "Educating our masters," as Beatrice Webb
put it, has rarely included rigorous technical skills in its curriculum,
and the construction of Englishness has emphasized the "countryside
of the mind." British means Home Counties English and this
projected image dwells partly south of the Cotswolds and partly in
The Wind in the Willows.69
The politics of this capital movement in part projects the
cultural image of the gentleman, the amateur and the civilizer of
inferior folk. For what made the curious configuration of the British
state possible was the development and deployment of a new service
class whose "natural" environment its members are taught to think,
is the metropolis.70
69 See the essays in R. Coils & P. Dodd, Englishness: Politics and Culture 1880-1920
(London: Croom Helm, 1987); Bill Schwarz, 'qhe Language of Constitutionalism: Baldwinilte
Conservatives" in Formations Collective, ed., Fonnations of Nation and People (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984).
70 'Emasculated Christian Gentlemen,' According to Corelli Barnett" in C. Barnett, The
Audit of War: The llusion and Reality of Britian as a Great Nation (London: Macmillan, 1986).
See P. Gowan, "he Origins of the Administrative Elite" (1987) 162 New Left Review 4.
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Newly ancient public and grammar schools, and Oxbridge
reinforced the cult of Englishness and fed the upper echelons of the
professions, which were reformed in the Gladstone era, and the civil
service. The latter may have been crucial for the stifling of social
redistribution. The Northcote-Trevelyan reforms,
served a unified, double objective that was obvious to informed contemporaries:
namely the creation of a new, unified elite of Oxbridge-trained upper class men
devoted to matters of policy and political management, and a simultaneous shift in
the structure of political power in the state71
to the executive branch. At the same time, Treasury control over
finance was installed and, of course, as was also recognized at the
time, the City and the Treasury were closely linked.
The common lawyers are as closely implicated in this
restructured capital as they were in the old. Through the
commodification of dwellings, financial institutions based in the City
reach, through the High Street solicitor,72 to virtually all but public
housing. As well, the central government squeeze on housing
authority funding is forcing those bodies into closer accommodation
with city institutions through complex leasebacks and other deals. 73
The central courts are tied into international capital by the
pattern of arbitration and litigation, the connection of whose parties
with London is often through brokerage, insurance, shipping or
money or commodity exchange contracts. Wealthy and corporate
clients can use lawyers to negotiate settlements, to design standard
contracts, devise tax schemes and create new configurations of
71 P. Gowan, ibid. at 31.
72 In 1968, more than 70% of solicitors' incomes was derived from property transactions,
56% from conveyancing, 2% from leasehold transactions, and 14% from probate and
administration. See Solicitors' Remuneration NPIB reference (1968) Cmnd 3529.
73 M. Loughlin, "Municipal Socialism in a Unitary State' in P. McAuslan & J.F.
McEldowney eds, Law, Legitimacy and the Constitution: Essays Marking the Centenary of Dicey's
Law of the Constitution (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1985). See also the introductory essay.
P. McAuslan & J.F. McEldowney, "Legitimacy and the Constitution: the Dissonance between
Theory and Practice"; M. Loney, supra, note 64 c. 7; and D.S. King, The New Right: Politics,
Markets and Citizenship (London: Macmillan, 1987) c. 7.
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property.74 Individuals must hope that, out of the professional
mystification they encounter in a lawyer's office, some good will
come.
The cost of operationalizing the legal system makes sense
only where large sums are at stake, either in a particular instance or
in the implications that a particular instance may have for other
dealings. In the property and commercial areas, lawyers, like their
clients, are alert to the need for coordination, and for efficient
resolution of the tensions between competing capitals. This is not
to say that in the rare occasions of litigation in a court the judges
will not make mistakes from this point of view, but "wrong" or
"unjust" decisions which evoke comments in law school manuals can
be accommodated within large-scale commercial strategies by altering
the phraseology of an exemption clause, or shifting the burden of
insurance, balanced by price adjustments.
The doughty citizen of Diceyan legend is likely to fare less
well. Such a person can probably not write off the costs and any
penalties as tax losses. But more importantly, court offices act as
conduits of economic power. Rich legal persons can extract
settlements from others by the threat of escalating costs. Also, in
low-level courts, the office acts significantly as a debt-collecting
agency for credit companies, rarely examining the detail of a claim.75
It may be worth repeating that the common law is within a
framework of Parliamentary government, but as an agency for a class
which, if Anderson and others are correct in their analysis, sets the
agenda for Parliament to work within. It performs less a
legitimating role than a facilitative one.
If we turn briefly to the criminal law, it is no part of my case
that law acts as a particularly repressive agency. The bulk of the
work done is a dismal process of administration, providing a link
M. Cain, 'The General Practice Lawyer and the Client: Towards a Radical
Conception" in R. Dingwall & P. Lewis eds, The Sociology of the Professions: Lawyers, Doctors
and Others (London: MacMillan, 1983). In the same volume, see also M. Galanter, "Mega-
Law and Mega-Lawyering in the Contemporary United States," The same point is made for
Australia in M. Sexton & L. Maher, The Legal Mystique: The Role of Lawyers in Australian
Society (London: Angus and Robertson, 1982).
75 Consumer Council Study, Justice Out of Reach: A Case For Snall Clahns Courts
(London: H.M.S.O., 1970). 90% of County Court summons served by company of utility
boards as plaintiffs.
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between the executive agencies of policing and disposals.76 Among
the minority of contested cases, the adversary procedure doubtless
offers the possibility and the substance of fairness. On the other
hand, judicial institutions have not shown themselves resistant to the
strategic use of state agencies to increase surveillance, and to
discipline minorities or those who seek radical reform.77
This is as one would expect. But if, as seems likely, the
"freedom" to reconstruct the UK economy principally as a rentier in
international capitalism requires a narrowing of the political
"freedom" to oppose that reconstruction, there is cause for disquiet.
Again, it should be repeated, legal institutions are not supine, but
rather agents for one side rather than another.
V. CONCLUSION
In social orders divided by the structures of class, gender and
ethnicity, the neutrality and even-handedness of law can be
maintained only if the system of legal institutions and rationality can
plausibly seem to be an outsider.78 Despite its appearance as the
agency of a particular class, a vestige of plausibility may remain if it
appears that class rule is not actually self-interested, but a desirable
intervention amid chaos and anomie which were its only alternative.
A case of this kind has not been argued convincingly for England.
As I have tried to show, quite the contrary.
76 D. McBarnet, Conviction: Law, State and the Construction of Justice (London:
MacMillan, 1984); P. Carlen, Magistrates'Justice (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1976); J. Baldwin
& M. McConville, Negotiated Justice: Pressures to Plead Guilty (Oxford: Martin Robertson,
1977).
77 C. Ponting, The Right to Know (London: Sphere Books, 1985); P. Hain, Political Trials
in Britain (London: Allen Lane, 1984); C. Aubrey, Who's Watching You? (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1982); T. Bunyan, The History and Practice of the Political Police in Britain (London:
Quartet, 1977); E.P. Thompson, Writing by Candlelight (London: Merlin, 1980) at 99-111, 149-
80; National Council for Civil Liberties, Southall 23 April 1979: The Report of the Unofficial
Committee of Inquiry (Nottingham: Russell Press, 1980); V. Kerruish & I. Duncanson, 'qhe
Reclamation of Civil Liberty" (1986) 6 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 3.
78 M. Cain, "Necessarily Out of Touch" in P. Carlen, ed., The Sociology of Law (Keele,
Staffordshire: University of Keele, 1976).
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